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1Abstract
The extent to which crop insurance programs have resulted in additional land being brought into
production has been a topic of considerable debate. We extend a multi-equation structural model
of crop acreage response, insurance participation, CRP enrollment, and input usage developed in
Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) to wheat and barley production in the “Northern Great Plains”
region. We also update earlier results for corn and soybean production in the “Heartland” region.
Our results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that increased participation in insurance programs provoke a
statistically signiﬁcant acreage response. This response is, however, relatively modest. We ﬁnd
that across-the-board decreases of 50% in insurance premiums signiﬁcantly increase participation
but result in acreage increases of about 0.47% for barley and 3.66% for wheat. In the modern
period (1997-1998), expanded insurance participation brought about by premium rate reductions
has almost no eﬀect on acreage. Our results for the recent period show an increase in insurance
participation due to the provision of revenue insurance.
2The Federal Crop Insurance Program -
An Empirical Analysis of Regional Diﬀerences
In Acreage Response and Participation
1 Introduction
Crop insurance programs have been a part of U.S. agricultural policy since the 1930s and their
prominence has increased in recent years as the program has expanded. Over most of its history,
the U.S. crop insurance program has been intended to protect agricultural producers from yield risk
by paying indemnity payments whenever realized yields fell beneath some guaranteed level. Though
the program has undergone many changes over its history, the basic components and operation of
the crop insurance program were largely unchanged until recent years. With the reductions in
federal price supports mandated by the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act
Of 1996, the federal crop insurance programs have been given a central role in providing for farm
income stability.1
Over the last several years, U.S. crop insurance programs have undergone signiﬁcant change.
In 1994, the Crop Insurance Reform Act (CIRA) brought about a brief period of mandatory
participation in the program and instituted a “catastrophic” (CAT) level of protection that was
intended to replace disaster relief payments at a very low cost to producers.2 The 1994 Act also
mandated development of insurance programs that would provide “cost of production” coverage to
agricultural producers. These programs along with innovations driven by private insurers led to
the development of several diﬀerent revenue insurance programs that provided protection against
lost revenue occurring from any combination of low prices and/or yields. There are currently
three primary revenue insurance products— Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Revenue Assurance
(RA), and Income Protection (IP). Participation has grown substantially in response to these new
programs and other policy changes that have made crop insurance more attractive to producers.3
Critics of the U.S. crop insurance program have noted the program’s relatively poor actuarial
performance. Between 1981 and 1999, the average loss ratio was 1.89, which implies that for each
dollar paid in by a farmer, an average of $1.89 was received back in indemnity payments.4 While
1The FAIR Act of 1996 eliminated (1) set aside and base acreage controls that provided supply control and (2)
deﬁciency payments that provided the farmer with protection against unfavorable price movements.
2CAT coverage is nearly free, requiring only a small administrative fee.
3For example, in 1995, total liability for corn insurance was $6.7 billion. In 2000, total liability for corn had grown
to over $9.8 billion, with $5.7 billion being accounted for by the CRC program (USDA-RMA, 2000).
4Loss ratios were calculated using unpublished data from the RMA. Note that this loss ratio does not include the
amount of premium paid by the government through premium subsidies. Of course, if such subsidies are included in
premiums, loss ratios are lower. In this light, what we consider to be poor actuarial performance may reﬂect large
1the loss ratios were of a large magnitude in general, they also diﬀered substantially across crops
and geographic location. During the period between 1980 and 1998, loss ratios ranged from 1.01
in Iowa to 2.97 in Arkansas and from 1.33 for corn to 2.55 for cotton. Thus, insurance programs
convey rather large and non-uniform net transfers from the government to agricultural producers.
While these programs provide positive net beneﬁts to participating producers, their provision
will enable an economic agent to better withstand risk, and thus provide incentives for agents
to assume greater risk. Likewise, if participation in any program conveys positive net economic
beneﬁts to producers, the program may alter incentives and thus distort production patterns. To
the extent that the beneﬁts of risk management programs are not homogeneous across crops and
across regions, production patterns may be distorted.
In addition, considerable concern that risk management programs provide inducements for pro-
duction of riskier crops in riskier regions has recently been raised. Environmental concerns lie at
the heart of this debate. The issue has typically been framed in terms of the “extensive margin” of
production. There are two fundamental margins at issue. The ﬁrst involves land within a region
(e.g., a county) that, in the absence of risk management programs, may not be planted because
of its relatively high risk. The second margin involves land in other growing regions that may be
brought into production if programs are provided to assist producers with the higher degree of
production risk associated with growing that crop in a region with less favorable growing condi-
tions. The conventional wisdom is that riskier regions and riskier land within a region tend to be
more environmentally fragile. Thus, programs which permit producers to assume more production
risk may actually damage the environment by encouraging production on environmentally-fragile,
marginal land. Goodwin, Smith, and Hammond (2000) considered a reduced-form model of the
eﬀects of risk management and conservation reserve programs on measured patterns of soil erosion.
Their results revealed a modest positive eﬀect of increases in participation in crop insurance pro-
grams on soil erosion. A larger positive eﬀect was exerted by direct government payments and a
very signiﬁcant negative eﬀect was found for the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).
A closely related though distinct issue involves the extent to which new land was brought into
production by the expansion of risk management programs in the 1980s.5 Increases in erosion could
reﬂect production shifts to more erosive land or, alternatively, simply expansion that brought more
land into production. Recent research by Keeton, Skees, and Long (2000) found that expansions in
risk management programs led to the introduction of about 50 million new acres of U.S. crop land
subsidies that are applied to premiums, which may in fact be actuarially sound.
5Since total crop acreage declined in the 1980’s, we could view the impact of risk management programs in terms
of mitigating against further acreage reductions due to falling crop prices instead of leading to actual crop acreage
increases.
2into use (where use includes planted acres, idled acres, and land in conservation reserves). A large
proportion of this increase, approximately 35 million acres, was accounted for by land put into the
Conservation Reserve Program. An alternative analysis by Young and Vandeveer (2000) suggested
very modest aggregate U.S. acreage responses to the provision of risk management programs.
Distortions created by crop insurance could be important for several reasons. First, if the
acreage response to insurance is large, there will be higher production and negative eﬀects on price.
The premium subsidy beneﬁts would be partially oﬀset by lower crop prices. These distortions
could carry over into input markets, aﬀecting demand for fertilizer, seed, chemicals, fuel, land
prices, and so on. Some regions of the country would be at a disadvantage relative to others
regarding production of particular crops. Higher production, if large enough to aﬀect prices, would
also aﬀect trade patterns. Negative environmental consequences, such as greater soil erosion and
water quality problems could result if marginal land was brought into production or if land switched
into production of crops with greater chemical use and more potential for erosion. If crop insurance
is encouraging acreage expansion, particularly onto marginal lands, then it may be at odds with
other government programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program, which is paying farmers to
switch land out of crop production into conservation uses.
The existing research has provided important insights into the eﬀects of the expansion of risk
management programs on production patterns. However, a wide gap exists in the implications of
existing studies, with some results (Keeton, Skees, and Long (2000)) pointing to large eﬀects and
others (Goodwin, Smith, and Hammond (2000) and Young and Vandeveer (2000)) showing modest
eﬀects. While most of the existing research is focused on national acreage and production response,
production conditions and the parameters of risk management programs are very heterogeneous
across regions and crops. For example, net indemnities for cotton, which tends to be largely regional
in production, are much higher than what is commonly observed for other crops. Likewise, loss-
ratios are much higher in some regions than for others, even for the same crop. This heterogeneity
suggests that a focus on aggregate eﬀects, though valuable, may conceal crop- and region-speciﬁc
eﬀects.
Using data from the Heartland region representing the U.S. corn belt, Goodwin and Vandeveer
(2000) estimated a system of equations representing farmer decision variables, i.e. insurance par-
ticipation, crop acreage response, and input use. This approach contrasted with previous research
that failed to take into account the simultaneous nature of the decision process and, therefore, did
not account for the endogenous nature of some of the independent variables.6 In addition, their
6Smith and Goodwin (1996) and Wu (1999) used Wu-Hausman tests to demonstrate that insurance, crop mix,
and chemical use decisions are not exogenous and can best be estimated using a simultaneous equations approach.
3study used empirical measurements of acreage shifts which contrasted with studies (Young and
Vandeveer (2000)) that relied on simulated data to measure acreage shifts.
Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) found a statistically signiﬁcant acreage response for corn and
soybean production to changes in insurance participation.7 The response was small in magnitude
with elasticities of acreage response to increases in insurance participation of 0.029 to 0.043 for
soybeans and corn, respectively. While their exploration of crop and region-speciﬁc eﬀects was a
valuable contribution, this focus on the corn belt did not address regions and crops suspected to be
most likely to experience acreage increases. Due to larger and more variable indemnity payments
and lower participation rates in other areas , ﬁndings based on data from the Heartland region
may not apply to other crops and areas of the country. At the same time, Goodwin and Vandeveer
(2000) concentrated on data from the period between 1983 and 1993. Many of the signiﬁcant
changes in the provision of crop insurance have occurred since 1994, particularly the availability of
revenue insurance instruments.
In this light, the focus of our analysis is on an extension of their work to include other crops and
geographic regions. Speciﬁcally, we will look at wheat and barley production in the Northern Great
Plains region during the period between 1985 and 1993.8 We will also provide updated estimates of
corn and soybean production in the Heartland region to cover the period where revenue insurance
instruments were available, speciﬁcally the 1997-1998 period. Following Goodwin and Vandeveer
(2000), we utilize estimates of structural models of variables reﬂecting the endogenous decisions of
agricultural producers to simulate the possible eﬀects of large premium changes. Our results reveal
that increased participation in the federal crop insurance program is indeed correlated with more
acreage for a given crop. However, the magnitude of the eﬀect, though statistically signiﬁcant,
is modest. Our conclusions are in agreement with earlier studies (Young and Vandeveer (2000))
that have concluded that the increases in acreage in production brought about by risk management
programs is small.
The plan of our paper is as follows. The next section discusses a conceptual framework for
considering the eﬀects of risk management programs on acreage allocation decisions. The third
section discusses the data and empirical framework used to empirically assess acreage response. The
fourth section presents estimates of structural econometric models of acreage response, insurance
demand, CRP participation, and input usage. Revenue insurance demand equations are included
in the Heartland update. Simulations of the eﬀects of premium changes are considered using the
7The Heartland region is one of nine regions enumerated in ”Farm Resource Regions” (2000). This includes Iowa,
Illinois, Indiana, and parts of Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky.
8The Northern Great Plains region is one of nine regions enumerated in ”Farm Resource Regions” (2000). This
includes North Dakota and parts of Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, and Colorado.
4model estimates. The ﬁnal section contains a review of the analysis and oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 Conceptual Issues
Theoretical considerations of the demand for insurance generally consider the actions of a risk averse
agent facing a single source of risk for which a risk-neutral insurer oﬀers some level of protection.
Stylized models that attempt to capture the essential elements of crop insurance plans are typically
rather simpliﬁed and thus often fail to capture actual characteristics of the operation of the crop
insurance program. For example, most crop farms are multiproduct operations. Multiple crops
face an array of risks from various sources. In addition, risks are often correlated across crops, such
that yield outcomes (and thus loss events) for individual crops are correlated.
In addition, the insurance choice (i.e., the participation decision) is made jointly with other
production decisions that must be made by producers. In our analysis, we focus on three decisions
(choice variables) that are relevant to the insurance participation decision. At the time of planting,
a producer must decide what to produce, how to produce it, and whether to participate in a
myriad of government programs that may be available. We focus on two speciﬁc policies that
were relevant to production decisions in the 1980s and 1990s—the federal crop insurance program
and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Thus, for a producer facing the option of growing
multiple crops, the decision involves the choice of a level of production (acreage for each crop), the
level of insurance to purchase for each crop (which potentially could be zero), and whether or not
to enroll land in the CRP program.
The focus of our analysis is empirical and thus we make no pretense as to the development of
a detailed theoretical framework for jointly evaluating acreage response, insurance participation,
and conservation program participation for multiple crops.9 However, some consideration of the
conceptual framework underlying such choices is useful.
Consider an agent that produces two crops, with per acre yields denoted by Y1 and Y2. Of a
ﬁxed amount of available land T, the agent must choose the level of acreage to devote to crop 1
A1 and crop 2 A2 and the level of acreage C to enroll in any set-aside program such as the CRP,
for which a payment of r per acre is received . Crops are produced using a single variable input
denoted as z. Usage of this input reﬂects agents’ self-protection against yield losses. Per-acre yields
for crop i are denoted by Yi(ei,z). The ei term represents a mean zero random shock to the yield
of crop i. Insurance is available that directly addresses the randomness associated with crop yields
9The motivated reader is referred to Innes and Ardila (1994) for a detailed evaluation of insurance participation
and soil depletion in a single crop model.
5by oﬀsetting the variability associated with ei.10 If we deﬁne the variance of ei to be σ2
i , insurance
has the eﬀect of reducing σ2
i say to λiσ2
i . Thus, λi (where 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1) represents the level of
pure insurance purchased. Insurance premiums for crop i, πi, will reﬂect the level of insurance
purchased and the variability associated with yields for crop i. Use of inputs z are costly, such that
total variable costs are given by c(z).
Under these conditions, agents will choose A1, A2, λ1, λ2, and z to maximize the expected value
of a utility of proﬁts function:
EV {Π} = EV {P1A1Y1(e1(σ2
1,λ1),z)+P2A2Y2(σ2
2,λ2),z)+(T−A1−A2)r−c(z)−A1π1−A2π2}, (1)
First order conditions are of the general form:
Vk = E{V 0(Π)Πk} = 0, (2)
where Πk denotes the derivative of proﬁts with respect to choice variable k. As Innes and Ardila
(1994) note, signing the eﬀects of risk in such a multiproduct maximization problem is complex.
Interactions among individual terms may also complicate comparative statics results. However, the
solution to ﬁrst-order conditions of the form given by (2) will yield estimable insurance demand
equations of the form:
λi = f(πi,Ai,C,φi) (3)
where φ denotes operator and farm characteristics relevant to the utility function (in particular,
risk preferences) and production conditions. We expect ∂λi/∂πi < 0. To the extent that production
of each product is joint and land is an allocatable input, acreage in one crop will be a function of
the acreage devoted to the other (see Shumway, Pope, and Nash (1984); Lau (1972); and Lynne
(1988)). Thus, acreage response equations will be of the form:
Ai = g(Pi,C,λi,Aj,φi). (4)
Equation (4) is a major focus of our analysis—in particular, we are interested in the sign and
magnitude of ∂Ai/∂λi. As we have noted above, a range of results as to this eﬀect exist in the
literature. Though our simpliﬁed empirical framework does not provide a prediction as to the
expected sign and magnitude of this eﬀect, we expect that the provision of economic beneﬁts
through insurance will result in expanded acreage and thus a positive relationship between acreage
and participation.
10In the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1970) deﬁnition of risk, such a plan represents “pure insurance” in that
it directly oﬀsets risk. An alternative form of insurance that more closely resembles what is actually available in
most insurance markets, including the U.S. crop insurance program, is “truncating” insurance, which compensates
for negative shocks.
6Previous research (Smith and Goodwin (1996)) demonstrated that fertilizer and chemical usage
for Kansas wheat producers tended to be negatively correlated with insurance purchases. That is,
growers that purchased insurance tended to use less inputs than those growers that did not buy
insurance. In more recent work, Wu (1999) found that changes in the crop mix may make the
overall relationship between insurance participation and fertilizer and chemical usage less clear.
If insurance encourages shifting toward crops with more demanding input requirements, insur-
ance participation may actually increase fertilizer usage. Thus, the expected relationship between
insurance participation and input usage is unclear.
3 Empirical Framework and Discussion of Data
As with Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000), our empirical analysis makes use of pooled cross-sectional,
time-series data collected at the county level. Our data cover the years from 1985-1993 for wheat
and barley production in the Northern Great Plains extension of the earlier study. We use data
from 1997-1998 for corn and soybean production in our update of the Heartland region results. 11
The results from our study will be compared to the earlier ﬁndings to see if the earlier results are
applicable when extended to other geographic areas and time periods.
The conceptual framework implies that the demand for insurance (i.e, insurance program par-
ticipation) should be inﬂuenced by the expected return to insurance. Returns to insurance will be
inﬂuenced by premium rates as well as the expected indemnity payments. Goodwin (1993) found
that adverse selection implied the potential for a diﬀerential response to premiums with respect to
expected indemnities. Following the approach applied there, we include premium rates, the average
loss ratio (for the preceding six years of experience in the county) and an interaction of the loss
ratio and the premium rate. We also include the coeﬃcient of variation of county average yields.
The average loss ratios should reﬂect expected indemnities or the adequacy of premium rates, while
the yield coeﬃcient of variation should reﬂect the yield risk faced by the producer. We also include
a measure of farm diversiﬁcation (the ratio of livestock sales to total sales) and a measure of the
overall land quality for a given county (the proportion of land in capability classes one and two).12
To account for the availability of revenue insurance in the 1997-1998 study period, we included
a variable representing the proportion of total liability accounted for by revenue insurance. 13
11A discussion of the variability in longitudinal data and its implications for our work can be found in Goodwin
and Vandeveer(2000).
12Land is categorized in eight classes with the quality or productivity of land decreasing as the the class number
increases. Therefore, classes one and two indicate the highest quality land.
13We should note that we do not believe our dependence on cross-sectional variability limits our modeling of revenue
insurance since such insurance was gradually introduced and adopted in limited geographic areas.
7Of course, this variable is jointly determined with other choice variables in the system and thus is
modeled endogenously as a function of the premium rate for revenue insurance and lagged insurance
participation.
Our empirical models of acreage allocations essentially consider factors that are relevant to the
expected return from producing the crop in question. Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) attempted
to capture the eﬀects of farm policy variables by including a measure of adjusted base acreage as
an explanatory variable. This was designed to capture the deﬁciency payments that were available
for corn during the period of study. This approach failed to account for other policy changes that
occurred during the study period. To avoid the shortcomings of trying to model all of the policy
changes that occurred during this period, we will include annual dummy variables for the years
contained in the sample. These dummy variables will pick up changes that occurred over time and
that are independent of the cross-sectional unit, i.e. the county. In addition to policy changes, the
dummy variables will also capture changes in output and input prices, as well as other factors that
vary by year but not across counties. While avoiding the problems associated with not capturing
all of the details of the applicable policies, this approach will make it diﬃcult to sort out the impact
of the various factors captured in the dummy variables. The dummy variables were also included
in the insurance participation equations, CRP participation equation, and input usage equations.
In addition, we included the acres diverted from wheat and barley production under the acreage
reduction program (ARP) in the acreage response equations for both wheat and barley. A scaling
factor of total county acres was used to replace the measure of total acres used by Goodwin and
Vandeveer (2000). 14The total land acres in the county was also included as an explanatory variable
in the insurance participation and CRP equations. In the earlier study, this scale variable suﬀered
from problems of potential endogeneity, since if insurance programs cause net increases in total
land in production, this variable will be endogenous to insurance participation and thus to land in
an individual crop.
In addition to the previously described land capability class variable, we also included variables
to account for diﬀerences in the quality of the land in each county. A variable (the K-factor) was
included to measure the susceptibility of the land for soil erosion. 15 Another variable (the T-
factor) was included to account for diﬀerences in land sustainability in the presence of soil erosion.
16
14Total acres in that study were deﬁned as the sum of harvested acres across thirteen major crop categories for the
earlier study. Clearly, such a variable may be endogenous to acreage decisions for a single crop.
15The K-factor is a relative index of the susceptibility of cultivated soil to particle detachment and transport due
to rainfall or overland ﬂow. Larger values of the index indicate land that is more susceptible to erosion by water.
16The T-factor measures the maximum rate of annual soil erosion that will permit crop productivity to be sustained
economically and indeﬁnitely. The values range from 1 to 5 tons per year, with 1 ton indicating fragile land and 5
tons indicating deep soil that is least subject to damage by soil erosion.
8Our empirical analysis is complicated to a degree by the fact that the CRP program was intro-
duced in 1986. CRP program participation is important to our analysis as it represents an important
use of crop acreage. The CRP program essentially provided producers with a rental payment for
removing land from production for conservation purposes. In 1985, participation in the CRP pro-
gram was exogenously ﬁxed at zero. In 1986 and subsequent years, CRP program participation was
endogenously determined by farms in a joint evaluation with other production decisions, including
acreage allocation and insurance program participation. To address this switching environment,
we utilize the following speciﬁcation for CRP:
CRPit = δ(Xitβ) + eit (5)
where CRPit is an indicator of CRP enrollment and δ is 1 if the year is 1986 or greater and is zero
otherwise. This is equivalent to endogenously modeling participation for 1986 and later and setting
participation exogenously at zero in 1985.17
We hypothesize that input usage, which is jointly determined with acreage and insurance par-
ticipation decisions, will be inﬂuenced by the crops planted, by insurance participation, and by land
quality characteristics. We include measures of land capability as well as a measure of the propor-
tion of agricultural land in each county that was allocated to grass and pasture in 1982. These
latter variables are intended to reﬂect soil and other land characteristics that may be relevant to
productivity and thus input usage patterns.
In short, for our analysis of wheat and barley acreage response and insurance participation in the
Northern Great Plains region, the preceding discussion implies a system of six equations— wheat
and barley acreage allocation equations, wheat and barley insurance participation equations, an
equation representing input usage, and an equation representing CRP enrollment. A similar system
of seven equations (adding equations for revenue insurance participation for corn and soybeans and
removing the CRP equation) was used for corn and soybeans in the Heartland region for the
updated period.
Data were collected from a wide variety of sources. Insurance program data were taken from the
RMA’s unpublished county level ”summary of business” database. An important caveat associated
with the use of such data should be noted at this point. Experience data are available only
for those farms that actually purchased insurance. Thus, to the extent that nonbuyers faced
higher rates than buyers, our premium rates may understate the actual rates faced by the entire
17The only diﬀerence in our approach versus a two step method where CRP participation is modeled separately for
1986 and later years arises from our use of three-stage least squares in estimation. Parameter estimates are identical
in the ﬁrst step of each case, though corrections made for cross-equation correlation may result in diﬀerences in ﬁnal
estimates. This arises in light of the fact that our application of three-stage least squares results in residuals that are
zero for the pre-1986 period where CRP participation is exogenously set to zero. The implications of our analysis
and the simulations that follow are entirely transparent to the manner of modeling CRP participation.
9insurance pool. This criticism is relevant to most other empirical studies of insurance demand and
participation. Unpublished NASS county level yield and acreage statistics were collected. Input
usage and farm sales statistics were taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Regional
Economic Information System (REIS) database. CRP statistics were taken from unpublished data
obtained from the Economic Research Service. Soil characteristics and land use patterns (grass and
pasture) in 1982 were taken from the NRCS National Resource Inventory (NRI) database. Nominal
economic variables were deﬂated using the producer price index.
The demand for insurance was measured as the ratio of actual liability to total possible liability.
Actual liability was measured by the real liability purchased by the farmer. Following Goodwin and
Vandeveer (2000), we constructed a rough measure of total possible liability by taking the product
of the futures market price, planted acres, and 65 percent of the average yield for the preceding
ten years. Alternative measures of participation that are commonly used include the ratio of net
insured acres to total planted acres. We argue that such a measure is likely to be inferior in that
it does not recognize the fact that the level of participation can be changed without cancelling
coverage merely by changing the price or yield coverage election. Variable deﬁnitions and summary
statistics for the variables included in the analysis of wheat and barley in the Northern Great Plains
region are presented in Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis of
corn and soybeans in the Heartland region are presented in Table 2. The analysis of wheat and
barley over the 1985-93 period utilized 1,090 observations. The analysis of corn and soybeans in
the 1997-98 period utilized 1,130 observations.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Model Estimates
Table 3 and Table 4 contain three-stage least squares parameter estimates and summary statistics
for the analysis of Northern Great Plains wheat and barley production for the 1985-1993 period
and Heartland corn and soybean production for the 1997-1998 period, respectively. The insurance
demand equations reﬂect a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between premium rates
and the level of participation for wheat and soybeans, while the corn equation show a negative
but statistically insigniﬁcant relationship. The premium rate coeﬃcient in the barley equation
is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant. At the data means, the results imply an elasticity of
demand of -0.01 for corn, 0.05 for soybeans, -0.18 for wheat, and -0.06 for barley. This compares
to an elasticity of -0.34 for corn and -0.35 for soybeans in the earlier study of the Heartland region.
Several factors make insurance demand less elastic in the later period, including the wide array
10of revenue insurance products available, higher premium subsidies, and higher degree of overall
participation. The relatively inelastic nature of these demand functions will play a critical role in
simulations of the eﬀects of premium subsidy changes on insurance participation presented below.
As previously mentioned, the 1997-1998 corn and soybean insurance participation equations
were conditioned on the existence of crop revenue insurance. The coeﬃcients on the revenue liability
variable were positive and highly signiﬁcant. The equation for corn revenue insurance exhibited
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between insurance demand and premium rates,
while the soybean equation exhibited a negative but insigniﬁcant relationship. The elasticities of
demand for the revenue insurance with respect to premium rates were -0.21 and -0.05 for corn and
soybeans, respectively. While it is diﬃcult to determine the extent to which shifting occurred from
APH to revenue insurance, we can conclude that the availability of revenue insurance signiﬁcantly
increased the overall level of insurance participation in the Heartland region.
In the case of the corn, wheat, and soybean equations, a higher average loss ratio appears
to signiﬁcantly decrease the responsiveness of agents to premium changes. In the case of barley,
however, the interaction terms are actually negative, though not statistically signiﬁcant.18 These
ﬁndings are relatively consistent with those in the earlier Heartland study.
Fertilizer and chemical expenditures exhibit the expected negative eﬀect for all of the crops in the
study. These results are inconsistent with the earlier Heartland study where fertilizer and chemical
expenditures had a positive impact on corn insurance participation. While it was previously argued
that it may be diﬃcult to separate the eﬀects of increased production of a crop and insurance
purchases on input usage since the input usage variable applies to all crops and not just to the
individual crop under consideration, these results indicate a clear negative relationship.19
The ratio of livestock sales to total farm sales is signiﬁcantly positive in the corn and soybean
cases, suggesting that farms (counties) with greater relative sales from livestock commodities are
more likely to purchase insurance. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in the earlier Heartland study.
This relationship is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the cases of wheat and barley. Counties
with more productive land, as represented by the land capability class variable, appear to purchase
less insurance in every case except barley, though the relationship is statistically insigniﬁcant in
the case of wheat. In the earlier Heartland study, we found a positive relationship between land
productivity and insurance participation.
18Identiﬁcation of this adverse selection eﬀect may be confounded by the inclusion of loss-ratios as a regressor. This
arises because of the manner in which insurance premiums are determined. In particular, the adjusted twenty year
loss experience in each county is used to deﬁne rates. Details regarding methods for premium rate determination can
be found in Goodwin (1994).
19The earlier study did not include an input price variable, while the present study represents this eﬀect with the
annual dummy variables.
11Higher average loss ratios, which correspond to higher expected relative indemnities, are pos-
itively correlated with greater demand for insurance for wheat and barley, but exhibit a negative
(though statistically insigniﬁcant) relationship for corn and soybeans. The earlier Heartland study
ﬁndings contained a signiﬁcantly positive relationship between average loss ratios and insurance
demand. The coeﬃcients on the CV yields are positive in all cases, though it is statistically in-
signiﬁcant in the wheat equation. The cases (wheat and barley) where both higher loss ratios
and higher yield CVs are positively correlated with insurance demand may suggest that there are
beneﬁts to producers both from the income subsidy eﬀects of insurance as well as from the risk
reduction brought about by crop insurance. Separately identifying the eﬀects may be diﬃcult.
Increases in acreage for each crop is correlated with more insurance purchases for that crop. This
ﬁnding is in agreement with the results of other research (see, for example, Goodwin (1993) and
Black and Dorfman (2000)) implying that insurance purchases are likely to be greater for larger
farms or larger areas in that incentives for selling on the part of agents working on commission are
likely to be greater in such cases.
The heart of our analysis lies in the acreage response equations. In the earlier Heartland study,
corn and soybeans exhibited a statistically signiﬁcant acreage response to increases in insurance
participation rates. The elasticity of corn acreage response to increases in participation was 0.04,
while the elasticity for soybeans was 0.03. Thus, small positive increases in acreage appear to
occur as increased participation in the insurance program takes place, though the magnitudes of
these increases are small. In the wheat equation, insurance participation had a signiﬁcant positive
impact on acreage response, while the barley equation contained a statistically insigniﬁcant and
small positive impact. The elasticities of acreage response to insurance participation were 0.02 for
barley and 0.06 for wheat, respectively. In the 1997-1998 Heartland equations, corn and soybeans
again exhibited a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship with insurance participation. The
elasticities of acreage response to insurance participation were 0.02 for both corn and soybeans.
This indicated a small reduction from the elasticities found in the earlier period, but both results
indicate that the acreage response is of a small magnitude. In total, our results indicate that
increases in insurance participation will yield small increases in crop acreage.
The dummy variables that were added to capture price and policy changes were of mixed signs
and degrees of signiﬁcance. While these dummy variables capture the impact of crop prices and
policy changes, it is diﬃcult to separate these from other changes that occurred over time that had
a common impact on all counties. We included total acres in the county as an indicator of the
scale of a county’s total size. This variable had an insigniﬁcant impact on acreage response in all
cases. As mentioned earlier, the use of total county acres as the scale variable avoids the potential
12endogeneity problem associated with the earlier Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) study.
In the earlier Heartland study, a strong negative eﬀect from CRP enrollment was implied by the
estimates for corn and soybeans. An insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect was found in the estimates from
the wheat equation. In the barley equation, a signiﬁcant negative relationship was found between
CRP enrollment and acreage response. As could be expected, an increase in CRP enrollment leads
to a reduction in crop acreage for three of the four crops. We also ﬁnd some evidence of shifting
among the alternative crops. Increases in wheat acreage are correlated with less barley acreage and
vice versa. In the 1997-1998 corn and soybean estimations, increases in the acreage of one crop
leads to a positive increase in the acreage of the other crop. While this is in contrast to the earlier
Heartland study where a negative relationship was observed, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient was
relatively small.
More corn and soybean acreage increased input usage, as did increased purchases of corn and
soybean insurance.20 In the Northern Great Plains estimation, more barley acreage and insurance
participation increased input usage, while the wheat insurance variable exhibited a signiﬁcant and
negative relationship with input usage. Increases in acres planted in wheat increased input usage,
but the impact was statistically insigniﬁcant. The results from the 1997-1998 Heartland estimations
were consistent with the hypothesis of a negative relationship, though the acres planted in corn
exhibited a positive relationship. These eﬀects could be expected since corn has much greater
fertilizer requirements than soybeans. Counties with land more suitable to pasture tend to exhibit
more input usage. Counties with more land suitable to grass tended to exhibit an insigniﬁcant
impact on fertilizer and chemical expenditures. Higher quality land tends to exhibit less input
usage per planted acre. This is consistent with ﬁndings in the earlier Heartland study. Again, it is
relevant to point out that our input usage applies to all crops and thus it is diﬃcult to identify the
eﬀects associated with individual crops.
4.2 Policy Simulations
In order to evaluate the implications of our analysis for the eﬀects of insurance participation on
acreage response, we considered a number of policy simulations. In particular, we consider the
eﬀects of large premium subsidy increases (i.e., premium decreases) on insurance participation and
land use patterns. Premium changes are “across-the-board” meaning that all counties’ premiums
are decreased by a proportionally equivalent amount. The rate change simulations essentially in-
volve exogenously changing premium rates (from their mean values) while holding all other variables
at their mean values. We then use the six equation system (or seven equation system with rev-
20Again, it may be diﬃcult to separate these eﬀects.
13enue insurance included) to evaluate how predictions regarding insurance participation or acreage
allocations change. We utilize estimates obtained treating total acreage as being exogenous and
allowing the loss ratios to be treated as endogenous variables.
The results from the 1997-1998 estimations for corn and soybeans are contained in Table 5.
A 50% reduction in both corn and soybean insurance premiums lead to a 5.83% increase in corn
insurance purchases and a 6.08% increase in soybean insurance purchases. Revenue insurance
purchases increase by 10.08% for corn and 2.57% for soybeans. . The impact on corn and soybean
acreage response was very small, ranging from 0.11% for corn to 0.13% for soybeans. These results
are consistent with the earlier Heartland study which indicated a relatively small impact on acreage
allocation. Reductions of 50% in the premium rate of one crop while holding the premium rate of
the other crop constant yielded similar results. Insurance participation increases by approximately
5% for the premium-reduced crop, while remaining relatively constant for the other crop. Again,
the impact on acreage response is minimal, ranging from 0.02% to 0.12%.
Table 6 contains the results of the same premium reduction simulations on wheat and barley
insurance purchases and acreage allocations in the Northern Great Plains region. A 50% reduction
in the insurance premiums for both wheat and barley results in a 48.7% increase in wheat insurance
purchases and a 40.5% increase in barley insurance purchases. Wheat acreage increases of 3.7%
and barley acreage increases of 0.5% are implied by the 50% reduction in both premium rates.
Reductions of 50% in the premium rate of one crop while holding the premium rate of the other
crop constant yielded similar results. Insurance participation increases by approximately 35.9%
(barley) and 53.7% (wheat) when the premium rate for that crop is reduced by 50%, holding the
other premium rate constant. The acreage response is minimal from the 50% reduction in the
barley premium, ranging from an increase of 1.0% for barley to a reduction of 0.5% for wheat.
A reduction in the premium rate for wheat leads to acreage increases of 4.2% for wheat and a
reduction of 0.6% for barley, respectively.
The overall implications of our results are quite clear. Even in the most extreme case, large pre-
mium decreases trigger signiﬁcant increases in participation but do not bring about large increases
in planted acreage for barley and wheat. In the most extreme case, a 50% decrease in premiums
which is accompanied by an analogous doubling of expected loss-ratios brings about an additional
0.5% increase in planted acreage for barley and a 3.7% increase in planted acreage for wheat. A
similar 50% reduction in premium rates for corn and soybeans yielded increases in acreage of 0.11%
for corn and 0.13% for soybeans, respectively. It should be noted that these results indicate that
diﬀerences exist between crops and regions as to the impact of premium rate decreases, i.e. crop
insurance subsidies. Given the existence of crop and region diﬀerences, our results would still seem
14to imply that expansions in the federal crop insurance program have not resulted in signiﬁcant in-
creases in planted acreage. Though the increases have indeed occurred and parameters underlying
these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant, the responses are quite modest.
5 Concluding Remarks
Signiﬁcant expansions of the U.S. federal crop insurance program have led many to question the
extent to which the risk protection and subsidies inherent in the programs triggered an expansion
in production. Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) considered a sample of reasonably homogeneous
counties in the U.S. corn belt region to address this issue. We have extended their methodology to
look at other crops in other regions to evaluate the general applicability of their results. We have
also extended their original Heartland data set to include years where revenue insurance instruments
were available.
Our empirical estimates suggest that the demand for insurance is quite price inelastic, with
elasticities ranging from 0.01 to 0.18. Our results also conﬁrm that increased participation in crop
insurance programs is indeed correlated with additional acreage in corn and soybeans. However,
simulations of the eﬀects of large premium decreases (50%) reveal that the eﬀects on acreage of
such policy changes are very modest. In particular, in the most extreme case we consider, an
across-the-board premium decrease of 50% for both crops implied increases in planted acreage of
0.5% for barley and 3.7% for wheat. Similar premium reductions for corn and soybeans induced
even smaller acreage responses, ranging from 0.11% to 0.13%. The lack of acreage response to
large premium rate reductions seem to result from a combination of the relative inelastic nature of
insurance demand with respect to premium rates and the inelastic nature of crop acreage responses
to changes in insurance participation rates.
Thus, our results would seem to support ﬁndings from the earlier study that suggests that
increases in insurance participation bring about relatively small acreage responses. Our results are
still preliminary, however, and much work remains to be done before deﬁnite conclusions on this
point can be reached. The diﬀerences in insurance participation and acreage response with respect
to diﬀerences in selected crop and geographic location indicate that additional crops and regions
should also be considered. For example, high loss ratios associated with cotton produced in Texas

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Table 3. 3SLS Estimates of Wheat/Barley Model
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-Ratio
.............................Wheat Insurance Participation .............................
Intercept 0.7126 0.0449 15.87∗
Premium −1.6335 0.3690 −4.43∗
Premium*LR 0.2217 0.1552 1.43
Fertilizer −12.9675 0.6265 −20.70∗
Land Capability −0.0163 0.0410 −0.40
Livestock Sales −0.2080 0.0259 −8.04∗
CV Yield 0.0001 0.0006 0.18
LR 0.0481 0.0104 4.63∗
Wheat Acres 0.0029 0.0007 4.37∗
County Acres 0.0056 0.0008 7.06∗
D86 0.0193 0.0208 0.93
D87 −0.0307 0.0213 −1.44
D88 0.0644 0.0209 3.07∗
D89 −0.0304 0.0216 −1.40
D90 0.1207 0.0219 5.52∗
D91 0.1585 0.0221 7.18∗
D92 −0.0236 0.0218 −1.08
D93 0.0447 0.0221 2.02∗
.............................Barley Insurance Participation .............................
Intercept 0.0796 0.0576 1.38
Premium 0.1040 0.3730 0.28
Premium*LR −0.1472 0.1493 −0.99
Fertilizer −1.7947 1.1423 −1.57
Land Capability 0.1523 0.0481 3.17∗
Livestock Sales −0.3052 0.0376 −8.12∗
CV Yield 0.0049 0.0007 6.82∗
LR 0.0730 0.0139 5.25∗
Barley Acres 0.0081 0.0019 4.20∗
County Acres 0.0049 0.0010 4.68∗
D86 0.0097 0.0234 0.41
D87 −0.0342 0.0243 −1.41
D88 −0.0324 0.0237 −1.36
D89 −0.0019 0.0241 −0.08
D90 0.0664 0.0250 2.66∗
D91 0.1810 0.0258 7.02∗
D92 0.0309 0.0258 1.20
D93 −0.0393 0.0272 −1.44
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the α = .10 or smaller level.
18Table 3. (continued)
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-Ratio
........................ Wheat Acreage Response ........................
Intercept 1.2222 0.9590 0.13
Wheat Acrest−1 1.1173 0.0323 34.63∗
Barley Acres −0.0752 0.0855 −0.88
Participation Wheat 1.9432 0.4768 4.08∗
CRP Enrollment 2.6561 3.4584 0.77
K-Factor −4.1364 1.9400 −2.13∗
T-Factor 0.2205 0.1878 1.17
Acre Diversion Wheat −0.2275 0.0388 −5.87∗
Acre Diversion Barley 0.2355 0.0946 2.49∗
County Acres −0.0018 0.0139 −0.13
D86 −1.3241 0.2747 −4.82∗
D87 −2.3833 0.4274 −5.58∗
D88 −1.7426 0.7336 −2.38∗
D89 1.6466 0.3989 4.13∗
D90 −0.2400 0.3193 −0.63
D91 −2.6185 0.3193 −8.20∗
D92 1.9149 0.2978 6.43∗
D93 0.1776 0.3433 0.52
........................ Barley Acreage Response ........................
Intercept 2.3331 0.3663 6.37∗
Barley Acrest−1 1.0202 0.0349 29.23∗
Wheat Acres −0.0451 0.0102 −4.42∗
Participation Barley 0.2566 0.1692 1.52
CRP Enrollment −8.3476 1.2554 −6.65∗
K-Factor −2.5852 0.7354 −3.52∗
T-Factor −0.1365 0.0700 −1.95∗
Acre Diversion Barley −0.1020 0.0410 −2.49∗
Acre Diversion Wheat 0.0701 0.0119 5.90∗
County Acres 0.0044 0.0055 0.80
D86 −0.4337 0.1114 −3.89∗
D87 −0.5105 0.1685 −3.03∗
D88 0.5125 0.2814 1.82∗
D89 −0.3671 0.1634 −2.25∗
D90 −0.8884 0.1523 −5.83∗
D91 −0.8551 0.1385 −6.17∗
D92 −1.4315 0.1148 −12.47∗
D93 −1.0609 0.1320 −8.04∗
19Table 3. (continued)
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-Ratio
....................................CRP Enrollment ....................................
Intercept −0.0177 0.0100 −1.77∗
Rental Rate −0.0005 0.0003 −1.89∗
Cost Share 0.0003 0.0002 1.57
Erosion Index −0.0051 0.0016 −3.10∗
County Acres 0.0017 0.0005 3.53∗
D86 0.0376 0.0151 2.49∗
D87 0.1318 0.0160 8.21∗
D88 0.2299 0.0158 14.56∗
D89 0.1226 0.0155 7.89∗
D90 0.1043 0.0155 6.73∗
D91 0.0262 0.0143 1.83∗
D92 0.0319 0.0144 2.18∗
D93 0.0314 0.0005 2.18∗
...................................... Input Usage ......................................
Intercept 0.0306 0.0018 16.89∗
Particpation Wheat −0.0406 0.0056 −7.21∗
Particpation Barley 0.0090 0.0051 1.78∗
Wheat Acres 0.0001 0.0001 1.34
Barley Acres 0.0008 0.0001 6.42∗
Grass82 −0.0024 0.0085 −0.28
Pasture82 0.0233 0.0094 2.46∗
Land Capability −0.0058 0.0032 −1.80∗
D86 0.0002 0.0016 0.10
D87 0.0010 0.0016 0.61
D88 0.0086 0.0016 5.32∗
D89 0.0011 0.0016 0.69
D90 0.0076 0.0017 4.40∗
D91 0.0086 0.0018 4.78∗
D92 0.0036 0.0017 2.05∗
D93 0.0075 0.0017 4.48∗
.........................................................................................
System Degrees of Freedom 6,679
System R2 0.8986
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the α = .10 or smaller level.
20Table 4. 3SLS Estimates of Corn/Soybean Model
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-Ratio
..............................Corn Insurance Participation ..............................
Intercept 0.4706 0.0378 12.46∗
Revenue Liability 0.4550 0.0245 18.55∗
Premium −0.3058 0.3363 −0.91
Premium*LR 0.3185 0.1273 2.50∗
Fertilizer −5.2767 0.4369 −12.08∗
Land Capability −0.1079 0.0218 −4.95∗
Livestock Sales 0.0619 0.0151 4.09∗
CV Yield 0.0027 0.0004 6.97∗
LR −0.0026 0.0047 −0.56
Corn Acres 0.0057 0.0006 9.01∗
County Acres −0.0043 0.0017 −2.58∗
D97 0.0432 0.0063 6.85∗
............................Soybean Insurance Participation ............................
Intercept 0.3806 0.0382 9.97∗
Revenue Liability 0.5612 0.0209 26.77∗
Premium −0.8818 0.2699 −3.27∗
Premium*LR 0.3521 0.1605 2.19∗
Fertilizer −4.3567 0.4670 −9.33∗
Land Capability −0.0767 0.0201 −3.81∗
Livestock Sales 0.0517 0.0140 3.70∗
CV Yield 0.0030 0.0005 6.02∗
LR −0.0029 0.0059 −0.48
Soybean Acres 0.0047 0.0007 6.70∗
County Acres −0.0039 0.0026 −1.53
D97 −0.0186 0.0056 −3.29∗
................................ Corn Acreage Response ................................
Intercept −0.6267 0.5188 −1.21
Corn Acrest−1 0.9134 0.0086 106.07∗
Soybean Acres 0.0756 0.0092 8.26∗
Participation Corn 0.4687 0.2324 2.02∗
K-Factor 0.4688 0.7123 0.66
T-Factor 0.0734 0.0762 0.96
County Acres 0.0125 0.0269 0.46
D97 0.1455 0.0468 3.11∗
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the α = .10 or smaller level.
21Table 4. (continued)
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-Ratio
...............................Soybean Acreage Response ...............................
Intercept −0.6244 0.4678 −1.33
Soybean Acrest−1 0.9111 0.0082 111.60∗
Corn Acres 0.0539 0.0081 6.62∗
Participation Soybeans 0.5686 0.2187 2.60∗
K-Factor −0.2602 0.6576 −0.40
T-Factor 0.0775 0.0694 1.12
County Acres 0.2028 0.0240 8.44∗
D97 0.2425 0.0424 5.73∗
......................... Corn Revenue Insurance Participation .........................
Intercept 0.1376 0.0161 8.53∗
Insurance Participation t−1 0.6058 0.0334 18.16∗
Revenue Premium −0.9224 0.1666 −5.54∗
D97 0.0166 0.0102 1.63
....................... Soybean Revenue Insurance Participation .......................
Intercept 0.0627 0.0145 4.32∗
Insurance Participation t−1 0.7667 0.0294 26.05∗
Revenue Premium −0.2473 0.1544 −1.60
D97 −0.0009 0.0094 −0.09
...................................... Input Usage ......................................
Intercept 0.0836 0.0014 59.87∗
Particpation Corn −0.0296 0.0092 −3.23∗
Particpation Soybeans −0.0269 0.0092 −2.94∗
Corn Acres 0.0010 0.0001 7.54∗
Soybean Acres −0.0009 0.0001 −5.77∗
Grass82 0.0101 0.0088 1.15
Pasture82 0.0229 0.0039 5.82∗
Land Capability −0.0222 0.0026 −8.51∗
D97 −0.0011 0.0006 −3.52∗
.........................................................................................
System Degrees of Freedom 7,573
System R2 0.9598
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